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This paper examines the influence of Irving Fisher’s writings on Milton Friedman’s work in monetary
economics. We focus first on Fisher’s influences in monetary theory (the quantity theory of money,
the Fisher effect, Gibson’s Paradox, the monetary theory of business cycles, and the Phillips Curve,
and empirics, e.g. distributed lags.). Then we discuss Fisher and Friedman's views on monetary policy
and various schemes for monetary reform (the k% rule, freezing the monetary base, the compensated
dollar, a mandate for price stability, 100% reserve money, and stamped money.)  Assessing the influence
of an earlier economist's writings on that of later scholars is a challenge. As a science progresses the
views of its earlier pioneers are absorbed in the weltanschauung. Fisher's Purchasing Power of Money
as well as the work of Pigou and Marshall were the basic building blocks for later students of monetary
economics. Thus, the Chicago School of the 1930s absorbed Fisher's approach, and Friedman learned
from them. However, in some salient aspects of Friedman's work we can clearly detect a major direct
influence of Fisher's writings on Friedman's. Thus, for example with the buildup of inflation in the
1960s Friedman adopted the Fisher effect and Fisher's empirical approach to inflationary expectations
into his analysis. Thus, Fisher's influence on Friedman was both indirect through the Chicago School





















Irving Fisher was the most prominent American economist of the early twentieth century. Milton 
Friedman was the most prominent economist of the later twentieth century. Fisher’s writings in 
monetary economics, especially the Purchasing Power of Money (1911) had a major impact on 
Friedman’s theoretical and empirical work in monetary economics. In addition, Fisher’s views 
on monetary policy and monetary reform aligned quite clearly with Friedman’s views. 
  This paper examines the influence of Fisher’s writings on Friedman’s work in monetary 
economics. We focus first on Fisher’s influences in monetary theory ( the quantity theory of 
money, the Fisher effect, Gibson’s Paradox, the monetary theory of business cycles and the 
Phillips Curve), empirics (eg distributed lags.). Then we discuss Fisher and Friedman's views on 
monetary policy and various schemes for monetary reform (  the k% rule, freezing the monetary 
base, the compensated dollar, a mandate for price stability, 100% reserve money, stamped 
money.)  Section 2 provides a brief biography of the two scholars and brings out some of the 
similarities of their careers. Section 3 discusses Fisher’s influence on Friedman’s monetary 
theory. Section 4 discusses Fisher and Friedman on monetary reform. To clarify Fisher’s 
influences on Friedman we document all the citations to Fisher in Friedman’s published work in 









2.1 Irving Fisher   
  Irving Fisher (1867 -1947) had a long, distinguished, and amazingly varied academic and 
business career. Fisher, the son of a Congregationalist minister, was born in Saugerties New 
York. He was an undergraduate and graduate at Yale, and spent most of his academic career at 
Yale first in the Department of Mathematics, then in the Department of Political and Social 
Science, and finally in the Department of Economics. He served as president of the American 
Economic Association in 1918 and as the first president of the Econometrics Society in 1931-33.  
  Fisher's academic contributions, many of which we discuss below, spanned a remarkably 
wide range. Fisher's major works in economics, many of which are still read and cited include 
"Appreciation and Interest" (1896), The Purchasing Power of Money (1911), Stabilizing the 
Dollar (1920), The Rate of Interest (1930), and the Debt-deflation Theory of Great Depressions 
(1933).  
  Fisher was also deeply committed to spreading the gospel of healthful living. One of his 
bestselling books, which ran through many editions, was How to Live. Fisher was also a strong 
supporter of Prohibition. His book Prohibition at its Worst (1926a) made the case for Prohibition 
in part by claiming that it raised productivity. Fisher even made a counterfactual calculation 
purporting to show how much national income had been increased through the adoption of 
prohibition. An inveterate inventor, one of his inventions, a system for manipulating index cards, 
made him a fortune. Fisher formed the Index Visible Company to market the invention and in the 
1920s it was merged into the company that became Sperry Rand. The fortune however, didn't 
last long; he lost it in the stock market crash of 1929.  
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2.2 Milton Friedman 
 Milton Friedman (1912 – 2006) had a long and distinguished career spanning the last six 
decades of the twentieth century. Friedman was an undergraduate at Rutgers University in the 
early 1930s where he studied under Arthur Burns and Homer Jones. He did his graduate work at 
the University of Chicago where Frank Knight, Henry Simons and Jacob Viner trained him in the 
Chicago tradition of classical economics. He also studied at Columbia under the mathematical 
economist and statistician Harold Hotelling and the institutional and empirical economists 
Wesley Clair Mitchell and John Bates Clark. Friedman spent most of his academic career at the 
University of Chicago. After retiring from Chicago in 1977 Friedman moved to the Hoover 
Institution at Stanford University for the rest of his life. 
  Friedman is known for his path breaking work in methodology, economic statistics, price 
theory, the consumption function and monetary economics. He was a champion of the modern 
quantity theory of money and was a founder (along with Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer) of the 
monetarist school that successfully opposed itself against the dominant Keynesian paradigm of 
the post World War II era. In three monumental books ( A Monetary History of the United States  
1963, Monetary Statistics of the United States  1970 and Monetary Trends in the United States 
and United Kingdom  1982) as well as numerous articles, Friedman and his collaborator Anna 
Jacobson Schwartz provided overwhelming evidence on the influence of the quantity of money 
secularly on the price level and on real income over the business cycle.  In this work and 
elsewhere Friedman documented the failures of discretionary monetary policy by the Federal 
Reserve from its founding and made the case for rules over discretion. For his scientific research 
in economics Friedman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1976. 6 
 
  Like Irving Fisher, Milton Friedman developed several proposals for monetary reform. 
Friedman long championed the case against discretionary monetary and fiscal policy made by 
Henry Simons and Lloyd Mints, two of his predecessors at the University of Chicago. Over the 
years Friedman devised several rules for policy formulation which have reflected his developing 
views on money and the economy. The first rule (1948) would maintain full employment by 
offsetting negative (positive) departures  by money financed budget deficits ( and surpluses). The 
second ( 1960) would have monetary authorities preserve price stability by expanding the money 
supply at a steady and known rate sufficient to finance the growth of real output allowing for a 
trend in velocity. A 1982 revision to that rule would have monetary authorities freeze the 
monetary base. To provide an efficient set of monetary arrangements ( the optimum quantity of 
money), the rule would set the rate of deflation equal to the real interest rate, or alternatively 
would pay interest on bank reserves and allow competing banks to pay interest on all deposits. 
Friedman (1960) also agreed with Simons (1936) on the case for 100% reserve banking and in 
1953 made a strong case for flexible exchange rates to govern the economic relationship between 
nation-states and against a return to the gold standard (1962b). 
  Finally, like Fisher, Friedman was a strong practitioner of normative economics. For over 
four decades he acted as the leading American advocate of the classical liberal order—free 
markets and free speech. His 1962 work Capitalism and Freedom made a strong case for limited 
government intervention in the economy. To address social ills he proposed schemes based on 
free market solutions: tuition vouchers to improve education, a negative income tax to help low 
income families and the abolition of conscription. 
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2.3 Parallel Careers 
  Milton Friedman called Fisher "the greatest economist the United States has ever 
produced"   (Friedman 1994, 37). We suspect that Fisher would have admired Friedman as well. 
After all, their careers share some remarkable parallels. Early in their careers both Fisher and 
Friedman made important contributions to pure theory.  Fisher published The Nature of Capital 
and Income in 1906 and Friedman with the statistician  Leonard Savage published papers on 
utility and risk (Friedman 1948, 1952). Both Fisher and Friedman went on, of course, to make 
lasting contributions, to monetary economics. Fisher's masterpiece was The Purchasing Power of 
Money (1911) and Friedman's, written with Anna J. Schwartz, was A Monetary History of the 
United States (1963). Both books use the quantity theory of money as their basic organizing 
principle. Both books attempt to estimate the quantity theory empirically and to do that both 
authors assembled new data on monetary aggregates. Both Fisher and Friedman, moreover, made 
theoretical advances in the construction of index numbers as an outgrowth of their attempts to 
assemble data with which to test the quantity theory: Fisher (1922) analyzed alternative formulas 
for computing price indexes and Friedman (1962a) analyzed alternative methods for filling gaps 
in economic time series. Both books relied heavily on economic history to test the quantity 
theory.   
  Both Fisher and Friedman were inveterate reformers who dedicated themselves to 
improving the world by crafting elegant reforms and then attempting to persuade the public of 
their validity. It is not surprising that they would both advocate reforms of the monetary system 
based on their studies of monetary history. But the range of reforms championed by both Fisher 























A monetary growth rule 
100% Reserves 
Balancing  the Budget over the Business Cycle 
Negative income tax 
All-volunteer army 
School Vouchers 
Medical Insurance vouchers 




  Even a brief comparison of the two cannot be complete without noting that the reputation 
of both men suffered for a time because of predictions that went badly wrong.  Fisher's bad 
prediction has become legendary. During the 1920s Fisher's opinions about the stock market 
were reported regularly in the papers. Fisher computed his own stock market indexes and the 
New York Times regularly reported their movements. But on October 15,1929, the Times 
reported  that Fisher had told a meeting of the Purchasing Agent Association that stocks had 
reached  “what looks like a permanently high plateau.” the Times went on to report that  
"While the tone of his address proper reflected a moderate optimism, in the informal 
questioning which followed Professor Fisher fell into almost unqualified optimism. In 
reply to one question, he declared that he expected “to see the stock market a good deal 
higher than it is today, within a few months"" (New York Times, Oct 16, 1929, 8.)  
 
Black Thursday was October 24, 1929. Fisher had made his optimistic prediction only weeks 
before the start of the most disastrous stock market decline in history.  
  Friedman's fall from grace came in the early 1980s. As Edward Nelson (2007) explains in 
his careful study of Friedman's post-1963 discussions of monetary policy, Friedman made 
inaccurate predictions of prices and the level of economic activity.  
 
"... from 1982 to 1985, Friedman repeatedly predicted a major revival of inflation that 
never occurred. In 1982 he predicted 8% inflation for 1983; the outcome was around 
4%.... In July 1983, Friedman wrote, “We shall be fortunate indeed if we escape either a 
return to double-digit inflation or renewed recession in 1984... In August 1983, he said, 
“U.S. inflation rates will rise appreciably in 1984, although it’s not yet determined where 
they’ll go from there.”... In April 1984, Friedman said, “I believe [the CPI] will be rising 
in the neighborhood of 8 to 10 percent in 1985.” Even in November 1985, Friedman said: 
“Inflation is not dead. It will emerge once again and will be higher next year than it is this 
year. We almost surely are currently at the bottom of this inflationary episode and are 
likely to be starting up again.”... Defying these predictions, inflation was consistently 
below 5% in every month from 1983 to 1986; moreover, apart from a brief uptick in early 
1984, inflation continued to decline after 1982, and was lower in 1986 than it was in 
1985" (Nelson 2007). 
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Friedman's predictions for the level of activity were also off the mark. 
 
 “Mr. Reagan may well face a very difficult situation by next fall,” Friedman said in late 
1983. “There is a real threat of a recession in the first half of 1984.” (NYT, 12/31/83). 
Instead, real growth continued throughout 1984, and was exceptionally strong in 1984 
Q1. “I have no easy explanation of what went wrong,” Friedman said after the strong 
output numbers were released (NYT, 04/30/84). 
 
  In Fisher's case, his reputation among economists, at least, has risen. Bad predictions 
have been forgiven and an understanding of the wide range and relevance of his contribution has 
risen (Dimand 1998). Perhaps the same will be true of Friedman in the long-run.  
 
3. Monetary Theory 
3.1 The Quantity Theory of Money 
Milton Friedman’s writings in monetary economics began  with “ The Quantity Theory of 
Money-A Restatement” in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money ( 1956). In this article, 
Friedman made the case for a revival of the quantity theory of money as a framework alternative 
to the dominant Keynesian approach to macroeconomics. The quantity theory for Friedman was 
a theory of the demand for money, a theory of income determination and a theory of the price 
level. According to Friedman, the quantity theory tradition which had been superseded by the 
Keynesian Revolution was still alive in the oral tradition of the Chicago School and that his work 
followed that tradition.









real money balances as a stable function of wealth (real permanent income), the relative prices of 
a number of important assets (financial and non-financial) and several institutional variables. 
Friedman’s approach followed the Cambridge cash balance tradition of Marshall, Pigou and 
Keynes which treated money as a temporary abode of purchasing power rather than the 
transactions approach of Irving Fisher’s Purchasing Power of Money ( 1911). Friedman ( 1956) 
does not cite Fisher although in his earlier “ The Methodology of Positive Economics “ ( 1953) 
refers to Fisher along with David Hume, the Cambridge School and Keynes as originators of 
major variants of the quantity theory. Several years later, Friedman clarified his position: 
“A more fundamental and most basic development in monetary theory has been the 
reformulation of the Quantity Theory of Money in a way much influenced by Keynesian 
liquidity analysis. That reformulation emphasizes money as an asset that can be 
compared with other assets; its emphasis is on what is called “portfolio analysis”, 
analysis of the structure of peoples’ balance sheets, of the kind of assets they want to 
hold. This emphasis looks at monetary theory as part of capital theory or the theory of 
wealth. This is a rather different emphasis on transactions and money as a mechanical 
medium of exchange somehow connected with the transactions process.” (Friedman 
1964, republished as chapter 3 in Friedman 1969 and 2006, 730) 
 
However in later work, beginning in 1970, Friedman gave ample attention to Irving Fisher’s 
seminal work on the quantity theory. In (1970a) he places Fisher at center stage in the monetarist 
counter-revolution. 
“ A counter-revolution must be preceded by two stages; an initial position from which 
there was a revolution… . I would like first to make a few remarks about the initial 
position and the revolution… The initial position I shall call the quantity theory of money 
and associate it largely with the name of an American economist, Irving Fisher, although 
it is a doctrine to which many prominent English economists also made contributions. 
The revolution… was made by Keynes in the 1930s. Keynes himself was a quantity 
theorist, so that his revolution was from, as it were, within the governing body. Keynes’s 
name is the obvious name to attach to the revolution. The counter-revolution also needs a 




In 1970b and also in (1982) Friedman goes through Fisher’s equation of exchange in great detail: 
“The most famous version of the quantity equation is doubtless the transactions 
version popularized by Irving Fisher (Fisher 1911, 24-54): 
MV = PT   (1) 
or 
  MV + M’V’ (2) “ 
Where M is the stock of currency, M’ the stock of demand deposits payable by 
check, T the volume of transactions, V the velocity of circulation of currency and V’ the 
velocity of circulation of deposits, and P a price index. 
 
Friedman (1970b and 1982) discusses the problems in empirically implementing Fisher’s 
quantity equations, especially those in measuring capital transactions and he makes the case for 
the income form of the equation of exchange. 
“ Despite the large amount of empirical work done on the transactions equations, 
notably by Irving Fisher and Carl Snyder ( Fisher 1911, 280-318, Fisher 1919, Snyder 
1934), the ambiguity of the concept of “transactions” and the “ general price level”, 
particularly those arising from the mixture of current and capital transactions—were 
never satisfactorily resolved. The more recent development of national income 
accounting has stressed income transactions rather than gross transactions and has 
explicitly and satisfactorily dealt with the conceptual and statistical problems of 
distinguishing between changes in prices and changes in quantities. As a result, the 
quantity theory has more recently tended to be expressed in terms of income rather than 
of transactions.” (Friedman 1970b, 198). 
 
Further Friedman (1988) discusses why Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary Trends (1982) do not 
include Fisherian transactions variables in their demand for money function: 
“ The idea that renders this approach attractive is that there is mechanical link 
between a dollar of payments per unit of time and the average stock of money required to 
effect it—a fixed technical coefficient of production as it were. It is clear that this 
mechanical approach is very different in spirit from the one we have been following. On 
our approach, the average amount of money held per dollar of transactions is itself 
regarded as a resultant of an economic equilibrating process, not as a physical datum… If 
for whatever reason, it becomes more expensive to hold money, then it is worth devoting 13 
 
resources to effecting monetary transactions in less expensive ways or to reducing the 
value of transactions per dollar of final output. In consequence, our ultimate demand 
function for money in its most general form does not contain as a variable the volume of 
transactions or of transactions per dollar of final output; it contains rather more basic 
technical and cost conditions that affect the costs of conserving money, be it by changing 
the average amount of money held per dollar of transactions per unit of time or by 
changing the number of dollars of transactions per unit of time or by changing the 
number of dollars of transactions per dollar of final output… “(Friedman 1988, 222). 
 
Despite his differences with Fisher, Friedman draws heavily on Fisher’s analysis of the basic 
cash balance adjustment mechanism of the quantity theory. Friedman’s (1969, 4-6), famous 
example of a helicopter doubling the quantity of money reads very much like Fisher’s discussion 
in the Purchasing Power of Money (1911, 153-154). 
According to Friedman: 
“Let us suppose now that one day a helicopter flies over this community and 
drops an additional $ 1000 in bills from the sky… If every individual simply decided to 
hold onto the extra cash, nothing else would happen. Prices (and nominal income) would 
remain what they were before, and income would remain at $ 10,000 per year. The 
community’s cash balances would simply be 10.4 weeks income instead of 5.2. But this 
is not the way people would behave. Nothing has occurred to make the holding of cash 
more attractive than it was before… The assumption that he [ an individual] was in a 
stable equilibrium position before means that he will now want to raise his consumption 
and reduce his cash balances at some rate. He will do so by trying to spend more than he 
receives. But one man’s expenditure is another man’s receipt. The members of the 
community as a whole cannot spend more than the community as a whole receives… 
People’s attempts to spend more than they receive will be frustrated, but in the process 
these receipts will bid up the nominal value of services” ( and since real output is 
assumed by Friedman to be determined by Walrasian general equilibrium, prices).   
Compare this to Fisher( 1911): 
“Suppose… that a doubling in the currency and circulation should not at 
once raise prices, but should halve the velocities instead… [p}rices being 
unchanged [an agent] now has double the amount of money in deposits which his 
convenience has taught him to keep on hand. He will then try to get rid of the 
surplus money and deposits by buying goods. But as somebody else must be 
found to take the money off its hands, its mere transfer will not diminish the 
amount in the community. It will simply increase somebody else’s surplus. Every 14 
 
body has money on his hands beyond what experience and convenience have 
shown to be necessary. Everybody will want to exchange this relatively useless  
extra money for goods. No one can deny that the effect of every one’s decisions to 
spend more money will be to raise prices… the only way to get rid of a plethora 
of money is to raise prices to correspond.“ [Emphasis ours]. (Fisher 1911, 153-4 
from Laidler (1991, 76.) 
Friedman in other writings voices his debt to Fisher’s quantity theory analysis. In his 1972 
American Economic Review article indicting the Federal Reserve for precipitating the Great 
Inflation, Friedman reflected on an earlier AEA session in 1910 in which Fisher (1911b) debated 
Laurence Laughlin on the causes of the mild inflation observed since 1896. Laughlin rejected the 
quantity theory and attributed the inflation to wage push and other non-monetary forces. Fisher 
attributed it to increases in the quantity of money. 
 According to Friedman: 
“Irving Fisher began his response, “I find myself unable to agree with most of the 
positions taken by Professor Laughlin in his able paper. In my opinion, “Fisher went on, 
“the old quantity theory is in essence correct. What it needs is to be restated, not rejected” 
(Fisher 1911b, 35). And now I must cease quoting from Fisher, with whom I am in total 
agreement, and proceed instead to plagiarize him—albeit with modifications to bring him 
down to date.” (Friedman 1972, 12). 
Finally, Friedman and Schwartz in Monetary Statistics of the United States (1970) acknowledge 
their obligation to Fisher for his earlier empirical work in the Purchasing Power of Money in 
constructing their money supply series. Unlike Fisher they treat demand deposits as money and 
their definition of money as a temporary abode of purchasing power also includes time deposits. 
In their reconstruction of existing series of currency and deposits they praise Fisher’s earlier 
work. Some of Fisher’s data is incorporated in their final data series. 
“However, only three [earlier researchers] constructed estimates for the period 
before World War I that are sufficiently close to our own to justify detailed attention… 15 
 
Irving Fisher, who constructed estimates of currency held by the public and deposits, 
1896-1901…” (Friedman and Schwartz 1970, 260). 
 
3.2 The Fisher effect 
Friedman incorporated Fisher’s famous relationship between the nominal interest rate and 
expected inflation into his main theoretical and empirical work in  money almost from the 
beginning. In Friedman‘s “The Quantity Theory of Money—A Restatement” (1956), although 
Fisher is not cited, the Fisher equation is included in his discussion of the rates of return on 
bonds and equities as arguments in the demand for money (Friedman 1956, 9). 
  Later with the  buildup of inflation in the mid 1960s Friedman (1968a and 1970a) and 
especially with Schwartz in Monetary Trends (1982) gives extensive coverage to the Fisher 
effect. In chapter 10 of Monetary Trends, “Money and Interest Rates”  in describing the state of 
knowledge in 1966 when they  wrote the first draft of the chapter: 
“Irving Fisher’s path breaking work, dating from 1896, distinguishing between 
nominal and real interest rates and examining the empirical role of inflationary 
expectations   was hardly known and was certainly not part of the received wisdom. 
Accordingly our first draft, which presented a full theoretical analysis incorporating 
Fisher’s work was devoted to testing his conclusions with our U.S. data.” (Friedman and 
Schwartz 1982, 477) 
Friedman and Schwartz then describe the explosion of literature on the Fisher effect that 
followed in the 1960s and 1970s; 
“ The first round of the explosion, like our first draft, consisted  largely of studies along 
the lines pioneered by Irving Fisher ( 1896, 1907, 1930) both redoing his work and 
extending it by introducing more sophisticated devices for estimating inflationary 
expectations. These studies largely confirmed Fisher’s results—in particular, his 
conclusion that inflationary expectations were formed on the basis of a long past period 
and only slowly adjusted to experience. This condition was the centerpiece of his work 16 
 
and the basis for his interpretation of the Gibson’s paradox—the long observed 
correlation between interest rates and the level of prices.” (Friedman and Schwartz 1982, 
478). 
In chapter 10, section 10.1 “Theoretical analysis” in Monetary Trends Friedman and Schwartz in 
analyzing the effects of monetary changes on interest rates, distinguish between the short-run 
liquidity effect, the medium–run income effect, and the long-run price anticipation effect 
attributed to Fisher. 
“When in our example, prices are rising at 5 per cent a year, the public will come 
sooner or later to anticipate the price rise. As a result, the 4 per cent initial interest rate 
can no longer be the equilibrium rate. We can no longer neglect the distinction to which 
Irving Fisher called attention between the nominal rate of interest and the real  rate of 
interest. Initially both equaled 4 per cent. If the nominal interest rate were to stay 4 per 
cent, the real yield would be -1 per cent. Nothing has happened in the real sector. In the 
tentative equilibrium resulting from the impact and income effects alone, to reduce the 
equilibrium real yield. As the inflation comes to be anticipated, lenders will come to 
demand higher interest rates and borrowers will be willing to pay higher interest rates. 
The nominal interest rate must rise above its initial level” (Friedman and Schwartz 1982, 
490). 
Friedman and Schwartz (1982, 583) also attributed to Fisher the important difference between ex 
post and ex ante real interest rates. Fisher’s analysis is important in the derivation of Friedman 
and Schwartz’s long-run money demand function. In discussing the “ Relation Between Yields 
on Nominal and Real Assets"  they argue that “for the purpose of studying monetary influences 
on interest rates—to follow Fisher and assume that the ex post real return on physical assets can 
be taken to be roughly constant on the average over time..” ( Friedman and Schwartz 1982, 522) 
and in footnote 48, they state “ As Fisher says in his chapter ‘Inductive Verification ( Monetary)’ 
in The Rate of Interest ( 1907),” ‘ In general the latter factor – unforeseen monetary change is the 
more important [compared with factors affecting the real rate on physical assets] … it is of 
course, not to be assumed that commodity interest [the real yield] ought to be absolutely 17 
 
invariable; but it is practically certain that its variation would not be three and a half times the 
variations in money interest, unless the price movement were inadequately perceived’ (1982, 
279-80). Friedman and Schwartz further reference Fisher; 
In the chapter in his later book, The Theory of Interest ,in which he presents his 
statistical calculations relating interest rates to past price change, Fisher does not 
explicitly discuss the constancy or variability of the real return on physical assets  until 
the final two sentences of the chapter.. He writes ‘ while the main object of this book is to 
show how the rate of interest would behave if the purchasing power of money were 
stable, there has never been any long period of time during which this condition has been 
even approximately fulfilled. When it is not fulfilled, the money rate of interest, and even 
more the real rate of interest [i.e the ex post real return on nominal assets] is more 
affected by instability of money than by those more fundamental and more normal causes 
connected with income impatience and opportunity to which this book is chiefly devoted 
‘ (Fisher 1907, 451). 
 
3.3 Gibson’s Paradox 
Friedman and Schwartz ( 1982) revisits the debate over Gibson’s paradox, the positive 
correlation between nominal interest rates and the price level discussed by Keynes in The 
Treatise on Money Volume 2 ( 1930). Fisher (1907) explained the phenomenon in terms of 
lagged adjustment of inflationary (deflationary) expectations to actual price change. He argued 
that it takes time for market agents to form expectations and that expectations of future price 
change would be formed based on past observed price change. Consequently the reason we 
observe the paradox of the price level (not the inflation rate) and interest rates moving together 
over long periods of time is because interest rates adjust slowly to rising or falling prices. 
“Suppose an upward movement of prices begins. Business profits (measured in money) 
will rise… Borrowers can now afford to pay higher ‘money interest’. If however, only a 
few persons at first see this, the interest will not be fully adjusted, and borrowers will 
realize an extra margin of profit after deducting interest charges. This raises an 18 
 
expectation of a similar profit in the future and this expectation, acting on the demand for 
loans, will raise the rate of interest. If the rise is still inadequate, the process is repeated, 
and thus by continual trial and error the rate approaches the true adjustment” (Fisher 
1907, 284-285). 
By contrast, Wicksell (1907) and later Keynes (1930) explained the paradox in terms of 
movements in the rate of interest. According to their argument, real forces such as technological 
progress and businessmen’s expectations explain long swings in the real yield on capital. Thus in 
the case of the upswing in the business cycle, the natural (real) rate of interest would rise creating 
a rising demand for loanable funds. Faced with the rising demand for loanable funds, banks 
would increase their loans and create money, letting their reserve ratios drop. Eventually they 
would react to their declining reserve ratios by raising their lending rates. Hence we would 
observe interest rates rising with prices.  
  To test his explanation, Fisher (1930, 407-44) constructed a measure of the expected  rate 
of price change as a weighted average of present and past changes. 
“[Fisher] developed distributed lags, and he applied them to the problem. He expressed 
the nominal interest rate as the sum of a real interest rate, implicitly assumed constant, 
and an anticipated rate of price change, and then approximated the anticipated rate of 
price change by a weighted average of prior price changes with the weights declining 
linearly and summing to unity—that is a triangular weighting pattern” (Friedman and 
Schwartz 1982, 547). 
Fisher performed these calculations using annual British data 1815-1914 and U.S. data 1870-
1914 for both short-term and long-term securities. Fisher then correlated the levels of interest 
rates with his measure of anticipated price change—increasing the length of the lags until R
2  
was maximized. He found that the mean lag that maximized R
2 was 10 years (the average of his 
experiments). 19 
 
  Friedman and Schwartz (1982, 548-565) discuss later criticisms of Fisher’s analysis and 
subsequent studies (some by Friedman’s students). The evidence generally corroborates Fisher’s 
analysis for the pre World War I period, but finds shorter lags in the interwar period and no 
relationship after World War II. 
“ Any shortcoming of Fisher’s explanation of Gibson’s paradox does not… in any way 
diminish the importance of his distinction between real and nominal interest rates, or his 
distinction between ex post and ex ante real yields , or his emphasis on the anticipated 
rate of price change in affecting both the demand and supply of loanable funds. But that it 
does put in serious doubt his highly specialized composite hypothesis that for the purpose 
of studying the influence on interest rates the ex ante real rate can be treated as a 
constant, and that interest rates follow the level of prices because borrowers and lenders 
estimate future inflation by a long weighted average of past rates of inflation” (Friedman 
and Schwartz  1982,  553). 
Friedman and Schwartz’s own estimates for the episodes covered by Fisher find lags of 
adjustment somewhat shorter than does Fisher,  
“All in all, the net result of these additional calculations is to reinforce our earlier 
suggestion that Fisher’s hypothesis is plausible for the pre World War I period, somewhat 
plausible for the interwar period, but not at all plausible for the Post World war II period. 
“ (Friedman and Schwartz 1982, 563). 
Friedman and Schwartz (1982, 564) like Cagan (1965) reject the competing Wicksell/Keynes 
hypothesis although later literature (Benjamin and Kochin 1984) and Barsky and Summers 
(1988) are somewhat more sympathetic. 
   Friedman and Schwartz (1982, 630) conclude their book by lauding Fisher as an early 
progenitor of the idea of rational expectations. 
“Irving Fisher was an early and sophisticated user of the basic idea of rational 
expectations. His expectation ( in 1896) that nominal interest rates would be relatively 
high during periods of rising prices and relatively low during periods of falling prices was 
based on the view that lenders and borrowers seek to anticipate price movements and 
allow for them in the interest rates  they are willing to accept or pay. His examination of 
empirical evidence persuaded him that there was an effect in this direction but that it was 20 
 
very much damped—the conclusion that we too have reached on the basis of experience 
for a much longer period. He suggested an explanation in terms of the slowness with 
which participants adopted their anticipations, leading to an appearance that interest rates 
vary with the price level rather than the rate of change.” 
 
3.4 Money and Business Cycles 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) “Money and Business Cycles” showed that NBER specific cycles 
in money growth preceded NBER reference cycle turning points, that the degree of severity of 
business cycles was closely correlated with the amplitude of cycles of money growth , and that 
evidence contradicted the view that cycles in money growth were mainly a lagged response to 
changes in the business cycle. They view Irving Fisher as a predecessor to their approach. 
“The topic of money and business cycles has been rather out of fashion for the past few 
decades. Before the Great Depression, it was widely accepted that the business cycle was 
a monetary phenomenon, ‘a dance of the dollar’ as Irving Fisher graphically described it 
in the title of a famous article.”
3 (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, chapter 10 in The 
Optimum Quantity of Money (1969) [2006] 
Friedman and Schwartz did not refer to the theory behind Fisher’s (1923) empirical analysis. It 
was based on the Fisher equation and was developed in Chapter IV of The Purchasing Power of 
Money, “The Transition period”. 
“The process begins with an initial equilibrium in which prices are steady, hence real and 
nominal interest rates are equal. The initiating disturbance is an increase in the gold stock. Prices 
rise  as do money profits” ( Steindl  1995, 36. Also see Laidler 1991, 77). But according to 
Fisher (1911, 59) “ the businessman’s profit will rise more… because the rate of interest he has 





to the sluggish adjustment of the rate. This leads to borrowing from the banks and a rise in 
deposits which raise prices more, also the velocity of currency and deposits rises. These effects 
further put pressure on prices and temporarily raise transactions (Steindl 1995, 37). The 
expansion ends when the nominal interest rate rises by the rate of inflation. Nominal rates rise 
because banks cut back on their lending as their reserves fall (Fisher 1911, 64). 
  The downswing will then follow because rising interest rates lower asset prices, 
businesses fail because they cannot renew their loans at former rates (Fisher 1911, 65), the 
public’s currency money ratio will rise and a bank run may follow. “It is then that the rate of 
interest rises to a panic figure” (Fisher 1911, 65), leading to a reduction in loans, a decrease in 
deposits and downward pressure in the price level (Steindl 1995, 37). According to Fisher (1911, 
65-66), “This culmination of an upward price movement is what is called a crisis—a condition 
characterized by bankruptcies, and the bankruptcies being due to a lack of cash when it is most 
needed” (Fisher 1911, 65-660.). 
  Fisher’s “dance of the dollar” reflects mainly fluctuations in the price level whereas 
Friedman and Schwartz focus on real economic activity. Also Friedman and Schwartz do not 
have a full fledged cyclical model. In their story monetary changes affect the relative rates of 
return of different assets (both financial and non-financial) in the community’s portfolio and by 
this portfolio balance substitution mechanism then affect the real economy. 
 
3.5 The Phillips Curve 
One of the key building blocks of the Keynesian revolution that Friedman challenged was the 
Phillips curve—the notion that there was a permanent tradeoff between the rate of charge of 22 
 
money wages (inflation) and the unemployment rate. This view based on A.W. Phillips (1958) 
empirical finding of a negative relationship between the rate of change of money wages and 
unemployment for the U.K. from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century led to 
Samuelson and Solow ( 1960) finding a similar relationship between  inflation and 
unemployment for the U.S. Based on this evidence it was argued  that policy makers could trade 
off lower unemployment for higher inflation. 
  In his AEA Presidential address in 1968, Friedman demonstrated that the Phillips curve 
tradeoff could only be temporary reflecting the lagged adjustment by workers to rising inflation.
4 
In the long-run the Phillips curve is vertical. Policy makers can only reduce unemployment 
below the natural rate by accelerating inflation. When Friedman wrote this paper he was 
apparently unaware that Irving Fisher had discussed an empirical relationship between price 
changes and unemployment I “A Statistical Relation between Unemployment and Price Changes 
“( 1926b). He later acknowledged its importance in a 1974 Institute of Economic Affairs 
Occasional Paper. 
According to Friedman ( 1974) ” [t]he discussion of the Phillips curve started with truth in 1926, 
proceeded through error some 30 years later, and by now has returned back to 1926 and to the 
original truth” ( Friedman 1974, 63) 
“Fisher’s article dealt with precisely the same empirical phenomena that Professor A. W.  
Phillips analyzed in his celebrated article in Economica some 32 years later…. Both were 
impressed with the empirical observation that inflation tended to be associated with low 
levels of unemployment and deflation with high levels… There was however a crucial 





error of 1958, which had to do with the direction of causation. Fisher took the rate of 
change of prices to be the independent variable that set the process going.” 
According to Fisher, 
“When the dollar is losing value , or in other words when the price level is rising, a 
businessman finds his receipts rising as fast, on the average, as this general rise of prices, 
but not for his expenses, because his expenses consist, to a large extent, of things which 
are contractually fixed… Employment is thus stimulated—for a time at least. ( Fisher 
1926b, 287)” 
Further according to Friedman; 
“To elaborate his analysis and express it in more modern terms, let anything occur that 
produces a higher level of spending—or, more precisely a higher rate of increase in 
spending than was anticipated. Producers would not at first interpret the faster rate of 
increase in spending as an increase in the demand for this product. The producers of 
shoes, hats, or coats would discover that apparently there was an increase in the amount 
of goods they could sell at pre-existing prices. None of them would know at first whether 
the change was affecting him in particular or whether it was more general. In the first 
instance each producer would be tempted to expand output, as Fisher states, and also to 
allow prices to rise. But at first much or most of the unanticipated increase in nominal 
demand… would be absorbed by increases (or fewer increases) in employment and 
output rather than by increases (or faster increases) in employment in prices. … Fisher 
was describing a dynamic process arising out of fluctuations in the rate of spending above 
some average trend or norm. He went out of his way to emphasize the importance of 
distinguishing between ‘high and low prices on the one hand and the rise and fall of 
prices on the other’ [Fisher 1926b, 288)… The most important distinction—and it is quite 
clear that this is what Fisher had in mind—is between anticipated and unanticipated 
changes” ( Friedman 1974, 65). 
Friedman then goes on to use the analysis of his 1968 AEA Presidential address to criticize 
Phillips.  
“Professor Phillips’ approach was from exactly the opposite direction [as Fisher]. He 
took the level of employment to be the independent variable that set the process going. 
He treated the rate of change of wages as the dependent variable. His argument was a 
very simple analysis—I hesitate to say simple-minded, but so it has proved—in terms of 
static demand and supply conditions.” (Friedman 1974, 66).  24 
 
Friedman then criticizes Phillips for treating the demand and supply of labor as a function of 
nominal wages as opposed to real wages, which he attributes to Keynesian thinking. 
“From this point of view, the essential element of the Keynesian revolution was the 
assumption that prices are highly rigid relative to output so that a change in demand of 
the kind considered by Fisher would be reflected almost entirely in output and very little 
in prices… The simple way to interpret Phillips is that he was therefore assuming the 
change in nominal wages to be equal to the change in real wages. [But] what he was 
saying was slightly more sophisticated. It was that changes in anticipated nominal wages 
were equal to changes in anticipated real wages.” (Friedman 1974, 68). 
Friedman then goes on to explain this approach as being based on the Keynesian notion that 
prices were rigid ” in the sense that people in planning their behavior do not allow for the 
possibility that the price level  may change” and that “real wages ex post could be altered  by 
unanticipated inflation “Friedman then shows “that both employers and employees come to 
recognize that prices in general  are rising which then reverses the rate of rise of anticipated real 
wages and effects the temporary boost to employment” ( Friedman, 1974, 73-74) 
 
4. Monetary Policy 
Neither Fisher nor Friedman were ivory tower economists. Both studied monetary theory and 
history with the idea of formulating policies that would improve the general welfare. Here we 
trace the monetary policy proposals of both men, and the relationships between their proposals. 
 
4.1 Bimetallism 
  Fisher came of academic age during the great battle of the standards -- the gold standard 
or bimetallism? -- in the late nineteenth century. One of his earliest papers was on the theory of 25 
 
bimetallism (Fisher 1894). Bimetallism was bound to attract Fisher: a policy proposal intended to 
improve the general welfare that could be analyzed by combining theoretical analysis and 
empirical research. Fisher saw some real merit in bimetallism. The position he adopted was that 
whether bimetallism improved stability depended on the bimetallic ratio adopted.  The 
bimetallists, led ultimately by William Jennings Bryan, wanted to adopt bimetallism at the 
traditional ratios (pre-Civil War) of 151/2 or 16 to 1. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, the world market ratio was far higher. Or to put it somewhat differently, the price at 
which the bimetallists proposed to coin silver was far higher than the world market price. The 
mint would be flooded with silver, the money supply would rise substantially, and the price level 
would rise substantially.  
Honest men must regard with horror the proposal to reintroduce a ratio of 15½ to 1. But 
we must not make the error of associating 'debasement' and 'bimetallism' 
indiscriminately.  Bimetallism can be just, if at a ratio equal to the existing ratio, .... It 
then acts as a sort of insurance against further appreciation of gold (Fisher 1894, 536) 
 
  Fisher’s famous paper “Appreciation and Interest” (1896) was also a response to the 
bimetallic controversy. The key questions motivating the paper were these: How much had 
debtors lost from the deflation under the gold standard and how much would  debtors gain if the 
deflation could be reversed by adopting bimetallism at the ratio of 16 to 1.   
  Fisher was not the first to conceive of the idea that nominal interest rates would adjust to 
incorporate expected rates of price change. Probably the idea has occurred to many people 
during periods of sustained price change. In his paper Fisher (1896, 5-9) cites a number of 
predecessors including John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, Jacob de Haas (1889), and John Bates 
Clark (1895). Clark's paper was aimed directly at the bimetallists. The deflation after 1879, Clark 
suggested, had been relatively steady and had been clearly foreseen. Therefore, contractual rates 26 
 
had been adjusted (lowered) to reflect the expected deflation. Debtors had lost nothing; it would 
be wrong to reward them by deliberately creating inflation. There is a reason, however, why we 
refer to the notion that nominal rates will adjust to reflect the expected rates of price change as 
the Fisher effect and not as the Clark-Fisher effect or the Haas-Clark-Fisher effect:  Fisher's 
paper was a tour de force. Fisher developed the pure theory of the relationship between real and 
nominal interest rates and explored many issues that would receive attention decades later 
including what happens when rates hit the "zero bound" and how the distinction between 
nominal and real rates affects the use of nominal rates as an indicator of monetary policy. He 
also drew the implications of his theory for the business cycle. Finally, he put together a large 
multi-country data base and used it to estimate the extent to which long-term price movements 
had been incorporated in nominal rates. Fisher, of course, did not have access to modern 
statistical techniques for analyzing panel data. His ability to squeeze meaningful conclusions 
from his data given the tools at his disposal was all the more remarkable.  
  Ironically, given the way we typically use the term "Fisher effect," Fisher's main 
empirical finding was that the adjustment of nominal rates to sustained price change was 
typically slow and incomplete. The debtors who had entered into contracts during the post civil 
war deflation had (contra J.B. Clark) lost something: The real rate they eventually paid was 
higher than what had been expected when they entered their contracts.
5 
  Despite this result, Fisher still concluded that bimetallism at 16 to 1 was a bad idea. Most 
debts, Fisher noted, were of relatively short duration. Many farm mortgages, for example, ran for 





already closed: nothing could be done to offset the unexpected losses on those contracts. The 
inflation to be expected from the adoption of bimetallism at 16 to 1 would overcompensate the 
debtors for deflation experienced under ongoing debts; it would "defraud the lender" (Fisher 
1985, 83).
6  Mere sympathy for the borrower, moreover, should not blind us to the ethical issues 
involved in changing standards at the ratio of 16 to 1. 
He [the farmer who borrows money] may lose and all farmers may lose and the causes 
may be in India or Australia or in the sun spots, but we can scarcely afford to surrender 
the ancient principle of the Inviolability of Contracts, through sympathy with the 
misfortunes of any individual man or group of men (Fisher 1895, 84). 
In the end, therefore,  Fisher concluded, as he had in his theoretical paper on bimetallism, that 
the Populist plan for bimetallism at 16 to 1 was wrong. But there was now an international 
dimension to his argument stemming from his new work on interest rates. 
As an improvement on the two single standards now existing, bimetallism, launched at 
the market ratio, may be worth serious consideration. But the proposal now before the 
world is bimetallism at 15 or 16 to 1. Such bimetallism means debasement of the standard 
for any single country which attempts it. If international it means debasement in gold 
standard countries, and a violent contraction and appreciation in silver standard countries. 
In no other way could the influence of the legal ratio on the market be felt. We should 
witness not only losses to creditors in the former countries but losses to debtors in the 
latter, and these losses would be far in excess of those which we have found to follow 
from the slow and half foreseen appreciation of the last twenty years (Fisher 1895, 85). 
 
  Friedman and Schwartz did not consider the mechanics of bimetallism in detail in A 
Monetary History and therefore did not cite Fisher's analysis. Bimetallism enters their story as a 
political force that produced limited attempts to monetize silver and uncertainty about the 
maintenance of the gold standard that in turn influenced the real economy. They did, however, 






uneasy compromise" that prevailed (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 134). They also ventured a 
tentative opinion that a return to a bimetallic standard after the Civil War would have been  
preferable (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 134, n. 52) to the adoption of a pure gold standard. 
  Later, Friedman returned to bimetallism in a series of papers reprinted in Money Mischief 
(1992). In these papers Friedman provided additional evidence supporting the conjecture in A 
Monetary History that an early adoption of bimetallism would have avoided the deflation under 
the gold standard thus producing a better behaved price level. Here Friedman acknowledged 
Fisher's pioneering work on the economics of bimetallism. Indeed, Friedman's late twentieth 
century research led him to conclusions about bimetallism that reinforced those reached much 
earlier by Fisher: As a monetary system, bimetallism had much to recommend it when contrasted 
with a pure silver or pure gold system,  but bimetallism in 1896 at 16 to 1 would have been a 
disaster.  Friedman, referring to Schumpeter's claim that Walras provided the best theoretical 
analysis of bimetallism produced when the controversy over bimetallism was intense, argued that 
"Irving Fisher's (1911) analysis is equally rigorous and far more accessible" (Friedman 1990, 
92).   
 
4.2 The Compensated Dollar
7 
Although he saw some potential in bimetallism (at the right ratio of silver to gold) Fisher went 








The idea -- to judge from Fisher's discussion in Purchasing Power of Money (1911, 337-347) -- 
grew out of his analysis of the gold exchange standards being adopted in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, for example in the Philippines after the American takeover. The basic 
idea of the gold exchange standard was to fix exchange rates with countries on the gold standard 
without making gold coins that circulated from hand to hand a part of the money supply, and 
thus to economize on gold. In the Philippines, for example, silver coins continued to circulate 
domestically, but they could be used at a fixed rate to purchase bills denominated in gold and 
payable from a gold reserve held by the Philippines in New York. Since Filipinos did not hold 
gold coins, moreover, it would be relatively easy to change the exchange rate between the silver 
coins they did hold and the amount of gold they could purchase with them. Indeed on one 
occasion the rate had been changed. Why not create a monetary system that took full advantage 
of the flexibility of the gold exchange standard? 
  Fisher imagined a monetary base consisting of gold certificates (yellowbacks) backed by 
a bullion reserve. The yellowbacks would circulate from hand to hand, but instead of being 
convertible into a fixed sum of gold they would be convertible into a varying amount linked to a 
general index of prices. The rule Fisher proposed for adjusting the value of the dollar was the 
essence of simplicity. Whenever the price level exceeded its ideal (par) value, the price of gold 












above par, then the monetary authority would lower the price of gold 5 percent; or equivalently 
one could say the monetary authority would increase the amount of gold in a gold dollar by 5 
percent. The holder of dollars would be "compensated" for an increase in the price level by being 
able to convert his yellowbacks into a larger physical amount of gold. If in the next period the 
price level was unchanged, and therefore was still 5 percent above par, the price of gold would 
be lowered another 5 percent. The price of gold, in other words, would continue to fall as long as 
the price level remained above par.  
  Suppose we define the percentage difference between the actual price level and the ideal 
price level as P
~
 and suppose we define the percentage change in the official price of gold made 
by the monetary authority as Pg*. Then Fisher's proposal could be written as follows.  
(1) Pg*t+1 = - P
~
 t 
  But how would compensation set up pressures that would return the price level to par. 
The simplest way to see what is happening under Fisher's plan is to consider the adjustments 
under a classic gold standard. Consider the Humean price-specie-flow mechanism. If country X's 
price level should rise above the long-run international equilibrium because of some arbitrary 
shock to velocity then country X would experience a balance of payments deficit. Exports would 
be discouraged because the price in foreign countries (the fixed exchange rate multiplied by the 
price in X would rise) and imports would be encouraged because import-competing industries 
would find their competitive positions eroded. The balance of payments deficit would mean an 
outflow of gold and hence a downward pressure on the money supply and prices. Fisher’s 
mechanism would reinforce the classic Humean adjustment. A country that experienced a price 
shock would find its exports decreasing even faster under Fisher’s scheme than under a classic 31 
 
gold standard because the par rate of exchange would move against the country with rising 
prices.
9   
  One implication of the compensated dollar scheme, as Fisher’s recognized and critics 
pointed out, is that exchange rates would no longer be fixed. And fixed exchange rates were 
considered one of the major benefits of the classical gold standard. Fisher later acknowledged 
this criticism and suggested that exchange rate stability could be maintained if all countries 
simultaneously adopted the compensated dollar scheme. In this case, changes in the world 
monetary base would be the key and would reflect gold mining and use of gold in the arts and 
industry. Again it would seem that Fisher's plan would reinforce the classical mechanism. An 
increase in the price level under the classical gold standard would mean a lower real price of 
gold, and hence a lower incentive to mine gold. Under Fisher's compensated dollar the real price 
of gold would fall even further because of coordinated reductions in the nominal price of gold. 
  Fisher suggested another scheme by which the stock of money could be automatically 
adjusted to maintain price stability under the compensated dollar scheme. Suppose as before that 
the monetary base consisted simply of yellowbacks entitling the holder to a fixed amount of gold 
held in reserve by the government.
10  Then the value of the gold reserve would be RPg where R 
is the gold reserve held by the monetary authority measured in ounces, and Pg is, as before, the 
price of gold measured in dollars per ounce. The government would, as in a conventional gold 








yellowbacks when they cashed them in and converted them into gold. Because of changes in the 
price of gold, however, the amount of yellowbacks circulating in the economy might exceed or 
fall below the value of the gold reserve. Now suppose that the government adopted a rule of 
maintaining the gold reserve at 100% by printing new yellowbacks and depositing them in banks 
when the gold reserve exceeded the amount of yellowbacks in circulation or cancelling 
yellowbacks paid in as taxes when the gold reserve fell short of the amount of yellowbacks in 
circulation. In symbols, the government would follow a policy of maintaining the following 
equation. 
(2) Mb = RPg 
 where Mb is the monetary base; the amount of yellowbacks in circulation.  
  Combine this relationship with Fisher’s price adjustment rule, and hold constant R and 
we can see that Fisher has advocated a simple monetary feedback rule. 
(3) Mb*t+1 =  - P
~
 t 
where Mb* is the percentage change in Mb. 
The monetary base would be reduced, other things equal, as long as the price level was above 
par. 
  The quantity theory interpretation of the compensated dollar, sketched above, was 
somewhat hidden in Stabilizing the Dollar. The reason, as Fisher explains, is that the quantity 
theory was controversial. Many people who rejected the quantity theory held some form of 
commodity theory of the price level. For them, prices were determined by the amount of 
precious metal in the currency. Fisher wanted to broaden the appeal of his proposal by showing 33 
 
believers in commodity theories of the price level that his scheme was something they could 
support.  
 
4.3 A Price Stability Mandate for the Federal Reserve 
During the 1920s Fisher was persuaded by the apparent success of the Federal Reserve  in 
maintaining price stability -- a period Friedman and Schwartz later referred to as the "High Tide 
of the Federal Reserve System" --  that the Federal Reserve could manage the money supply so 
as to maintain price stability. It was, as Fisher saw it, the story of the leadership of the Federal 
Reserve by Benjamin Strong Jr., the highly regarded Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. Fisher now argued that the Federal Reserve could and should maintain price level 
stability by controlling the stock of money through open market operations and changes in the 
discount rate.  Fisher's main concern was that the stability enjoyed in the 1920s depended on the 
understanding and leadership of one man. Fisher wanted to institutionalize a price stability rule. 
He later explained all this in a remarkable letter to Clark Warburton found by Thomas Cargill 
(1992). Fisher explained his support of a legal mandate for price stability as follows. 
... I tried for years to get through Congress a simple bill to require the Federal Reserve 
System "to use all it powers" to stabilize the price level. This was called the Strong Bill, 
named after Congressman Strong of Kansas, no relative of Governor Strong. Governor 
Strong said to me, "if you get that bill passed I will resign. Let me alone. God save me 
from my friends. If you will let me alone I will try to do the best I can but if you make me 
do by law what I am trying to do without legislative control, I will be so afraid that I 
cannot fill the bill that I will not accept the responsibility." I have always believed that 
had Governor Strong lived, we would not have had the tragic depression following the 
stock market crash in 1929 or so big a crash to start with. I think the realization of what 
was going to happen shortened his life. He had because of illness resigned in 1927 and 
died in 1928. I was told that he paced the floor in distress realizing that his policies were 
being abandoned. When he made the above remark to me I said: "Governor Strong I will 
trust you as long as you live but you will not live forever and when you die I fear that 
your policies will die with you." (Fisher to Warburton 1946, Cargill (1992, 1274).  34 
 
 
In the same letter Fisher went on to explain that the failure of the Federal Reserve to stem the 
depression resulted from a realization of what he had feared in the 1920s -- that leadership would 
end up in the hands of someone who did not understand the basic relationships among monetary 
policy, the stock of money, and the price level. 
In fact, after he [Strong] died, and after the crash, I was asleep at the switch until in the 
summer of 1931 1 called on Eugene Meyer, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. I 
said: "I am getting alarmed to see demand deposits diminish. It seems to me this may 
make great trouble." He said: "What did you call the figure?" Amazed, I said: "The full 
name is individual deposits subject to check without notice." He rang a bell and asked his 
assistant to bring in the last controller's report open to the page where the figures were 
given for individual deposits subject to check without notice. In a few minutes the report 
came in and I pointed and said: "You see that during the last several call dates there has 
been a continuous reduction." He said, "Yes, I see it." (Fisher to Warburton 1946, Cargill 
(1992, 1275-76). 
 
Clearly in this letter Fisher was working from an interpretation of the origin of the Great 
Depression that was very close, if not identical, to what  Friedman and Schwartz developed in A 
Monetary History. Friedman and Schwartz were not aware of this letter when they wrote A 
Monetary History; if they had been (Friedman told Cargill) they would have cited it extensively. 
Friedman and Schwartz did, however, cite a published comment by Fisher that contains the 
essence of Fisher's and Friedman and Schwartz's critique of the Federal Reserve. 
"Governor Strong died in 1929. I thoroughly believe that had he lived and his policies 
had been continued, we might have had the stock market crash in a milder form, but after 
the crash there would not have been the great industrial depression." (quoted in Friedman 
and Schwartz 1963, 413 n.171. 
 
  In advocating a mandate of price stability Fisher was on the same page as Henry Simons 
and Lloyd Mints at the University of Chicago. The clearest statement of the case for a price rule 
is to be found in Simons' famous paper “Rules vs. Authorities” (1936). Here Simons considered 35 
 
but rejected the case for a monetary rule on the grounds that defining a single stable monetary 
aggregate would not be possible. Simons might have cited, indeed probably should have cited, 
Fisher as an important authority who had advocated the same (or at least a very similar) goal, but 
did not. According to Don Patinkin the Chicago economists tended to distance themselves from 
Fisher in the 1930s because by that time Fisher had come to be regarded as something of a crank 
(Dimand 1998, 206; Patinkin 1993). It was unfair to Fisher's contribution to monetary 
economics, but the Chicago economists, like Fisher, were anxious to get their plans adopted, and 
Fisher, the vegetarian prohibitionist who made wildly inaccurate predictions about the stock 
market, and advocated stamped money (see below), was no longer a voice of authority that 
added weight to an opinion.  
  There was also a matter of style. Henry Simons did not cite Fisher in "rules vs. 
authorities;" but then Simons generally did not waste a lot of ink citing his predecessors. There is 
no list of references and no names mentioned in footnotes in his famous paper. Lloyd Mints, on 
the other hand, did cite Fisher frequently in A History of Banking Theory (1945). Mints (1945, 
272, n. 33) includes Fisher in a large group of economists who had supported some form of price 
stability mandate.  In Monetary policy for a competitive society Mints (1950, 126)  describes 
Fisher as the "stoutest advocate of price level stabilization" in recent years although he claims 
that Simons, his former colleague, was "the most convincing."  
  Milton Friedman (1959) followed in Simon's tradition and advocated a monetary rule, but 
broke with Simons and advocated a monetary growth rule rather than a price stability rule. 
Friedman saw the problems of choosing a particular monetary aggregate as less important than 
Simons. Friedman believed that the monetary aggregates tended to move together and hence the 36 
 
goal of monetary stability could be attained by choosing any of them. And Friedman believed 
that the loose connection between money and prices created a problem for price level targets. 
How could the Federal Reserve be held accountable for missing a target when so many 
unforeseeable events could prevent them from hitting it? Here Friedman echoed the concerns 
that Benjamin Strong had expressed to Fisher. "If you will let me alone I will try to do the best I 
can but if you make me do by law [stabilize prices] what I am trying to do without legislative 
control, I will be so afraid that I cannot fill the bill that I will not accept the responsibility." 
  Friedman always insisted that he had proposed a monetary growth rule as the best that 
could be achieved given the limited state of understanding of monetary economics. Later, 
Friedman was impressed by Allan Greenspan's handling of monetary policy and praised 
Greenspan without insisting that a monetary growth rule would have produced greater economic 
stability. In this respect Friedman's response to Greenspan was similar to Fisher's response to 
Benjamin Strong.  
 
4.4 Stamped Money 
  In the wake of the collapse from 1929 to 1933 Fisher (Fisher, Cohrssen, and Herbert 
Wescott Fisher 1933; Fisher, and Herbert Wescott Fisher 1934) championed a radical scheme for  
ending the depression: stamped money. Fisher had no doubt that expansionary open market 
operations could increase the money supply. But at the height of the slump he feared that the 
increase in bank reserves would not be lent out or that an increase in currency would be hoarded. 
So he proposed an alternative, stamped money, that he thought would increase velocity. At the 
same time the Chicago economists, Mints and Viner, had similar concerns about the 37 
 
effectiveness of monetary expansion, and their preferred remedy to offset the depression was 
money financed fiscal expansion (Steindl 1995, 86-92, 105). For similar reasons, Fisher 
abandoned his earlier theory of the business cycle, chapter 4 of Purchasing Power of Money, in 
favor of his Debt-Deflation theory of the Depression (Fisher 1933).
11  
  The basic idea of stamped money was simple. Currency would be issued (by the central 
government or even by a local government) to pay for its expenses. Unlike ordinary currency, 
however, stamp scrip would require that a tax be paid on the money at regular intervals. If the tax 
was not paid, the value of the scrip as currency would be reduced. On a specified date from the 
time of issue, for example, a $1.00 bill would sink in value to, say, $.95 cents unless a $.05 
stamp was purchased for the bill. The tax might be paid at the local post office where the bill 
would be stamped to show that the tax had been paid. The point was to get more money into 
circulation and give people an incentive to spend their money rather than hoard it. In advocating 
stamped money Fisher was again reacting to current events. Hundreds of communities in the 
United States and around the world were issuing scrip as a way of meeting budget deficits, and 
providing currency for local communities hard hit by bank failures. Scrip, of course, does not 
have to be stamp scrip. It was often simply an IOU issued by a local government, perhaps issued 
in a convenient denomination with the hope that it would circulate as money in the local 
community. But some communities did experiment with stamped money; following the ideas of 
Silvio Gesell, a German merchant and economist whose writing were the economic and spiritual 








himself into  movement, setting up a kind of clearing house for information about stamped 
money and carrying on a vast correspondence with communities looking for advice on how to 
issue stamped money.  
  Keynes (1936, chapter 23) also wrote favorably about Gesell and stamped money. But 
stamped money did not impress the Chicago economists in the 1930s. In his critique of the 
Beveridge Report Simons (1945, 236) ventured simply that "I have never liked the Gesell-
Fisher-Dahlberg schemes," one of his few references to Fisher. Friedman, as far as we have been 
able to determine, did not take up the idea of stamp scrip. However, in the case of another "wild 
scheme" that emerged in the darkest days of the Depression Fisher and the Chicago economists 
were on the same page.  
 
4.5 100% Reserves 
  The basic idea of 100% money, like the other reforms Fisher championed, is ultimately 
very simple. Banks would be required to hold 100% of their deposits in reserve rather than being 
permitted to hold fractional reserves banks. Banks would become simply warehouses for money. 
To earn a profit they would have to charge fees for storing and transferring cash. Although if the 
government paid interest on reserves held at the Federal Reserve, as has recently become the 
case, the banks would have another source of income.  
  The point of 100% reserves is that it would make impossible in the future the kind of 
collapse of the money supply that had occurred between 1929 and 1933. The amount of high-
powered money had not declined drastically, but the money multiplier had. The multiplier is a 
function of the reserve ratios of the banks, which had risen, and the currency deposit ratio of the 39 
 
public which had also risen. Under 100% reserves the money multiplier would always be one. 
Fisher believed that with the adoption of 100%  reserves and one of his schemes for controlling 
the monetary base, price level stability and hence stability of the real economy could be 
achieved.   
  As usual, Fisher was advocating a fundamental reform that was a logical extension (to 
him) of current trends. Like many economists at the time Fisher (1936) looked at the large excess 
reserves that banks had been building up simply as a ammunition for a future inflation that could 
be defused by raising required reserve ratios.  He also pointed out that charging depositors, 
especially small depositors, for depositing, withdrawing, and transferring their funds had become 
common. The moment seemed propitious for imposing 100 percent reserves. 
  Fisher (1936) acknowledged that the case for 100 percent reserves had first been made 
during the depression in a mimeo circulated by Simons and other members of the economics 
department at Chicago, although Fisher indicated that the same idea had occurred in earlier great 
depressions. Fisher also acknowledged the contributions to the development of the idea made by 
other economists in the debate that was inspired by the Chicago memo. Fisher saw his 
contribution, evidently, as he had in the case of stamped money, as absorbing the thinking of his 
fellow economists, and then packaging these radical sounding ideas in a form that would 
persuade the public. Although these crusades, like his others, went nowhere, it is unlikely that 
anyone else could have done a better job: Fisher could write swiftly, draw on a large store of 
historical and current examples, and find striking metaphors with which to illustrate his 
argument.  40 
 
  Milton Friedman (1959, 65-75) made 100 percent reserves one of the key elements in his 
Program for Monetary Stability. Friedman (1959, 108, n.9) referred to the work of Simons and 
Mints as well as several journal articles as his starting point,  but did not mention Fisher's work 
on 100 percent reserves. Given Fisher's popularizing purpose, this is perhaps understandable. 
Like Fisher, Friedman pointed to a recent development in the economy, in this case the massive 
purchase of government bonds by banks during World War II, to illustrate the feasibility of the 
proposal. In a Program for Monetary Stability, incidentally, Friedman claimed to have modified 
the Chicago plan, as 100 percent reserves was sometimes known, in only one way: having the 
Federal Reserve pay interest on reserves. This reform was finally adopted in the wake of the 
2008 crisis.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Irving Fisher had considerable influence on Milton Friedman’s monetary economics. Although 
Friedman’s revival of the quantity theory was not based on Fisher’s transactions approach, 
Friedman acknowledged Fisher as one of the founding fathers. The Fisher effect of anticipated 
inflation on nominal interest rates was a key building block in Friedman and Schwartz’s  
theoretical  and empirical work in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed Fisher’s development of 
distributed lags were a key component in Friedman’s empirical work and that of some of his 
students. Friedman and Schwartz also lauded Fisher’s monetary theory of the business cycle as a 
predecessor to their work although they did not  adopt Fisher’s theoretical framework. Finally 
Friedman acknowledged Fisher as  having sketched out a critique of the Phillips curve 40 years 
before he did.  41 
 
  Both Fisher and Friedman as adherents to the quantity theory favored reforms to the 
monetary system within that framework. Fisher's proposals included the compensated dollar 
which was a scheme to stabilize the price level by altering the gold content of the dollar. But this 
was equivalent to stabilizing the monetary base and the money supply. Later, in the 1920s Fisher 
was a staunch advocate of the Strong Bill which would have mandated the Federal Reserve to 
follow a price stability target. Friedman, operating in a different monetary regime proposed his 
k- percent rule of steady and known monetary expansion. Later he favored freezing the monetary 
base and thereby creating the optimum quantity of money which brought him close to one of 
Fisher's early proposals. Both Fisher and Friedman, moreover, were advocates of 100 percent 
reserves. Fisher's debt-deflation theory of the depression and his stamped money proposal were 
temporary departures from his earlier emphasis on the supply of money which Friedman did not 
embrace. Both Fisher and Friedman blamed the Federal Reserve for creating the Great 
Depression and both believed that had Benjamin Strong lived that the outcome would not have 
been nearly as dire. And both believed that some sort of legal mandate should be instituted so 
that good policy did not depend on anyone individual being at the helm of the Federal Reserve.   
In sum, Irving Fisher was a pioneer Friedmanian; and Milton Friedman was a latter day 
Fisherian.  
  Assessing the influence of an earlier economist's writings on that of later scholars is a 
challenge. As a science progresses the views of its earlier pioneers are absorbed in the 
weltanschauung. Fisher's Purchasing Power of Money as well as the work of Pigou and Marshall 
were the basic building blocks for  later students of monetary economics. Thus, the Chicago 
School of the 1930s absorbed Fisher's approach, and Friedman learned from them. However, in 42 
 
some salient aspects of Friedman's work we can clearly detect a major direct influence of Fisher's 
writings on Friedman's. Thus, for example with the buildup of inflation in the 1960s Friedman 
adopted the Fisher effect and Fisher's empirical approach to inflationary expectations into his 
analysis. Thus, Fisher's influence on Friedman was both indirect through the Chicago School and 
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